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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

Appellants-Plaintiffs Val D. and LaRee Westover (together "the Westovers") sued
Respondent-Defendant Franklin County Assessor Jase Cundick ("Cundick") in his individual and
official capacities on July 30, 2015, seeking writs of mandate and prohibition and damages for
alleged slander of title. The basis of the Westovers lawsuit was a May 29, 2015 letter from Cundick
to Val Westover and Rocky Mountain Power stating that (based on a review of property records,
including a convoluted history of recording different deeds), the Westovers did not own property on
which they had recently recorded an easement in April 2015 (the easement agreement is dated March
17, 2015). The Westovers asserted Rocky Mountain Power initially threatened to shut off power and
remove equipment from the Westovers' property, but then agreed to take no action so that the
question of ownership could be resolved. Ownership was in fact resolved and the May 29 letter was
effectively negated just over a week later, on June 8, 2015, when the Westovers recorded deeds
showing ownership and the assessor's office consequently changed its records to show the Westovers
did own the property. The Westovers nevertheless commenced litigation seeking special writs.
Even though the relevant question ofownership was clarified prior to litigation, on December
11, 2015, Cundick voluntarily issued a follow-up letter to the Westovers and Rocky Mountain Power
further clarifying that the Westovers owned the property as of the date of the easement (March
2015). This letter was based on the fact that the Westovers finally decided to show Cundick a copy
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of their real estate sales contract, which they had previously chosen not to disclose. Nevertheless,
the Westovers continued to pursue litigation, adding to their complaint an additional claim for
tortious interference with a contract or prospective business advantage. They later moved to have
this claim and their slander of title claim voluntarily dismissed, which was granted without prejudice
- thus leaving only the claim for a writ of mandate and a writ of prohibition. The District Court
dismissed the claim for special writs because there were adequate remedies at law at the time the
lawsuit commenced, including a claim for an injunction.
The Westovers now appeal that decision, contending that the District Court should have
amended their claim well after the fact into a claim for an injunction and entered appropriate relief,
despite the fact that they acknowledged to the District Court that the perceived wrong in this case
had already been righted. As it stands now, however, there is nothing for the Court to resolve and
there would be nothing on remand to enjoin.
B.

Statement of Facts

Cundick wrote the May 29 letter based on the following information and records that were
available to him at the time:
November 26, 2007 Memorandum of Real Estate Contract. Prior to November 26, 2007,
the listed owners of the property affected by the easement (hereinafter referred to as "the Property")
were Don and Connie Westover (Val Westover's parents). (R. at 12-13.) On that date a
Memorandum of Real Estate Contract (hereinafter referred to as "the Memorandum of Sale") was
recorded indicating that Don and Connie Westover had conveyed the Property to the Westovers.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 2.

(Id.) The real estate sales contract itself was not provided or shown to the assessor's office because
it contained information about the sale the Westovers did not want made public. (November 12,
2015 Tr. at 9:3-4.) No ownership was transferred on the records of the assessor's office through the
Memorandum of Sale and the listed owners thus remained Don and Connie Westover.

February 25, 2008 Quitclaim Deeds. On February 25, 2008, two quitclaim deeds were
recorded to trade ground involving the Property between Don and Connie Westover and Dexter and
Linda Ralphs. These were recorded as Instrument Nos. 240669 and 240670. (R. at 161, 164-65.)
These quitclaim deeds adjusted the acreage of the respective parcels and indicated that Don and
Connie Westover had remained the owners of the Property. (See id.)

December 3, 2012 Warranty Deed. On December 23, 2012, a warranty deed conveying the
Property from Don A. Westover to the Don A. Westover Trust was recorded as Instrument No.
256758. (R. at 162, 166-67.) Questions were raised by the assessor's office regarding the legal
description used for the warranty deed, and a letter was sent to Don Westover regarding these issues.
(R. at 162, 168.) Based on this warranty deed, the assessor's office updated the owner of the Property
to the Don A. Westover Trust.

April 20, 2015 Underground Right of Way of Easement. On March 17, 2015, the
Westovers executed an agreement with Rocky Mountain Power for an underground easement, which
they later recorded on April 20, 2015. (R. at 17-20.)

May 14, 2015 Warranty Deed. On May 14, 2015, a warranty deed conveying the Property
from Don and Connie Westover to the Westovers was recorded as Instrument No. 26443. (R. at 162,
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169-70.) This recording did not formally appear in the assessor's records and in its systems until after
Cundick sent his May 29, 2015 letter. More so, because the listed owner of the Property was still the
Don A. Westover Trust- not Don and Connie Westover-the deed did not change the record of title
in the assessor's office. (See, e.g., R. at 179.)
May 29, 2015 Letter. On May 29, 2015, Cundick sent the letter to Val Westover and Rocky
Mountain Power informing them of his concern that "the property description included in [the April
20, 2015 Underground Right of Way of Easement] is not owned by the Grantor ... [and] for further
clarification of the ownership of property please contact our office." (R. at 22.)
June 8, 2015 Quitclaim Deed. On June 8, 2015, a quitclaim deed was recorded conveying
the Property from the Don A. Westover Family Trust to Val and LaRee Westover. This was recorded
as Instrument No. 264663. (R. at 171-72.) The assessor's office deemed the Don A. Westover Family
Trust to be the same entity as the Don A. Westover Trust and ownership ofthe Property was changed
in the assessor's office to Val and LaRee Westover, who are the currently listed owners and were so
on the date they filed their lawsuit. The deed itself indicates a copy of it was to be sent to the
Westover's counsel's office upon recording. (Id.)
Thus, on June 8, 2015, there was no dispute about who owned the Property. As the situation
stood at the time the complaint was filed on July 30, 2015, the Westovers were the currently listed
owners of the Property and were able to record their easement with Rocky Mountain Power, since
there were no longer any ownership discrepancies on record in the Franklin County Assessor's
Office. Nevertheless, the Westovers commenced their lawsuit.
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C.

Procedural History

The original complaint filed on July 30, 2015, alleged that the Westovers owned the Property
since November 15, 2007, pursuant to a real estate sales contract and Cundick's May 29 letter was
therefore unlawful. (R. at 5-10.) The complaint did not address the other transactions that had been
recorded, as set forth above. (See id.) The Westovers further alleged that Rocky Mountain Power had
threatened to (but had not taken any action to) cut off power to the Property, remove its equipment,
and declare them in breach of contract. (R. at 6.) Original Complaint.) None of these things ever
happened.
About two months after the lawsuit commenced, the Westovers provided an affidavit from
a Rocky Mountain representative discussing what had previously transpired between the Westovers
and Rocky Mountain Power prior to the lawsuit commencing stating that, while originally it had
threatened to cut off power within thirty days, it agreed to not take any action because Val Westover
represented "that he would take care of it. ... " (R. at 117-18.) Rocky Mountain Power made clear
that they did not intend to take any action while the matter was pending, and simply reserved the
right to take action if it did not receive assurance about ownership of the Property. (Id.) It is unclear
whether the Westovers provided Rocky Mountain Power with such assurances by providing a copy
of the June 8, 2015 quitclaim deed, upon which the assessor's office determined that the Westovers
owned the Property.
The original complaint contained a cause of action for the issuance of a writ of mandate
specifically ordering Cundick to retract his alleged slander of title in the May 29 letter, and a generic
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writ of prohibition preventing Cundick from: (1) "exceeding his authority in making property
ownership determinations for purposes beyond those required for taxes, and from communicating
those determinations to third parties[;]" and (2) "from refusing to change ownership records when
presented with documents showing a conveyance of property." (R. at 8-10.) The original complaint
also contained a cause of action for slander of title. (R. at 7-8.)
Shortly after the original complaint was filed Cundick's attorney sent the Westovers' attorney
a letter, dated, August 17, 2015, setting outthe chronology of the recorded documents, as described
above, and pointed out that the question of ownership had been resolved with the June 8 deed and
that the Westovers could go forward with their affairs relating to the Property and Rocky Mountain
Power as planned. It would therefore be a waste to move forward in the litigation. (R. at 178-80.)
A telephone conversation between counsel was arranged to discuss these issues, but Cundick's
counsel was not able to make contact with the Westovers' counsel. (R. at 174-75, ,r 2.) Instead, the
Westovers responded shortly thereafter by filing an amended complaint adding a third claim for
tortious interference with a contract or prospective business advantage. (See R. at 32-40.)
Cundick filed a motion to dismiss on September 28, 2015, on the basis that the Westovers
lacked standing because there was no evidence of a concrete, particularized and actual or imminent
harm. Instead, the lawsuit was based merely on an old threat by Rocky Mountain Power and the issue
of ownership was resolved as of June 8, 2015, almost two months before the lawsuit was filed.
Additionally, Cundick argued that the petitions for writ of mandate or prohibition must be dismissed
because it was not apparent Cundick had violated any clear legal right, he had no clear legal duty to
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retract his letter, and there were alternative remedies available to the Westovers: for example, claims
for slander of title and tortious interference (which they had already brought) or declaratory or
injunctive relief (See R. at 63-71.)
The motion to dismiss was set for a hearing for November 12, 2015. (R. at 77.) Prior to the
hearing, the Westovers filed a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit from a representative
of Rocky Mountain Power indicating that it had previously agreed with the Westovers that it was not
going to take any adverse action against the Westovers pending clarification of ownership of the
Property. (R. at 87-88, 117-18.) There was by June 8, 2015, however, no dispute that the Westovers
owned the Property. It is unclear whether the Westovers communicated to Rocky Mountain Power
that the issue of ownership had been resolved by June 8, 2015.
During the November 12 hearing, Val Westover personally represented to the District Court
that there were ways to resolve the dispute. One was for Cundick to "say, yes, [the Westovers] did
own [the Property] at that time, then it's in writing, the issue would then be resolved." (November
12, 2015 Tr. at 14:22-25.) Mr. Westover and his attorney also explained that they did not provide
a copy of the actual real estate contract in order to clarify ownership because it had information in
it that the Westovers did not want others to know about (presumably family members). (Id. at 9:3-4,
11 :25 - 13: 12.) The District Court stayed ruling on the pending motion to dismiss and ordered
mediation. (Id. at 19:8-20:24.)
Notably, the District Court indicated correctly during the hearing that it believed this case
is "ludicrous" and a waste of time and money. (See id. at 5:11-12, 6:2-3, 7:6-7, 19:18:24) (stating at
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various places: "I can't figure out why we're here, to be frank .... " "Then why are we here?" "Why
are we wasting-paying attorneys? ... " "What I want to understand is why are we spending attorney
fees now to litigate a moot issue?" "I don't think it's in anyone's best interest to continue this fight
and this litigation. I think this should have been resolved and could have been resolved if there had
been an effort to do that. It seems ludicrous to me that we're going to continue to incur additional
attorney fees and costs beyond sitting down and figuring out a way to get this matter resolved.")
Immediately after the November 12 hearing, the parties, with counsel, briefly met in a side
room in the courthouse to discuss these issues and decided that the Westovers would provide a copy
of the real estate contract, along with an agreement that it would remain confidential, and if Cundick
was satisfied that it showed they owned the property at issue at the time they recorded the easement,
then he would issue a new letter to the Westovers and Rocky Mountain Power making that clear.
This was exactly what Val Westover had stated in court would resolve the case. However, in
subsequent communications with plaintiffs counsel, it was clarified that the letter related only to the
issue of the special writs but would not resolve the slander of title and tortious interference claims.
(R. at 175, ,r 3.)

Nevertheless, Cundick's attorney signed a confidentiality agreement proposed by the
Westovers' attorney stating that the real estate contract would be confidentially provided to Cundick
for his review, along with a draft letter proposed by the Westovers for Cundick to send them and
Rocky Mountain Power upon his satisfaction that the Westovers owned the property at the time of
the easement. (R. at 176, ,r 4.) The Westovers then provided a copy of the real estate contract and,
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after reviewing it, Cundick issued a letter, dated December 11, 2015, using the exact language
proposed by the Westovers, stating in full:
On May 29, 2015 this office advised you that the property description included in the
document referenced above [i.e., the easement] was not owned by the Grantor. Upon
further investigation we have determined that on the date the easement was granted,
Val D. Westover was the owner of the property in question.
(R. at 176, ,r 5; R. at 173.) (bracked language added).
With the December 11 letter, the claim for a writ of mandate and prohibition should have
been once and for all resolved, as there was nothing for a writ of mandate to order take place and
nothing for a writ of prohibition to stop. The mediation would thus focus on resolving the remaining
claims for slander of title and tortious interference. Instead, on January 7, 2016, one week before the
mediation and during the period when these matters had been stayed, the Westovers filed a motion
seeking entry of judgment on their special writs, and seeking to dismiss without prejudice their
claims for slander of title and tortious interference. (R. at 131-32; R. at 133.)
Mediation occurred on January 15 and did not result in the case being resolved.'
Consequently, the District Court held a hearing on February 11, 2016, in order to address Cundick's
motion to dismiss and the Westover's motion for entry of judgment.

'The Westovers' brief states that "[t]he mediation proceeded primarily on the issue of
attorney fees to be paid to the Westovers." (Appellant's Br. at 8.) Cundick strongly disagrees with
this characterization. Nevertheless, the mediation was confidential and both parties signed a
confidentiality agreement.
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During the February 11 hearing, the Westovers' attorney essentially conceded the issue is
moot:
THE COURT: I guess my question for you, why this crusade? The wrong that you
perceive has been righted in this case?
Mr. ATKIN: It has.
(February 11, 2016 Tr. at 6: 15-18) (emphasis added). Their dialogue then focused on the Westovers'
concern that they subjectively believed the perceived wrong involving the Assessor's May 29 letter
could potentially happen again to them or to others in Franklin County, and contended that it would
be appropriate for the District Court to enter relief- whether that be in the form of a writ of mandate
or prohibition, or an injunction (which they had never previously requested either in their original
complaint or at any time subsequent to that hearing). (Id. at 6:19 - 9:5.) At no time during this
hearing did the Westovers ask to amend their complaint a second time, and they did not file a motion
to amend, though on appeal they assert that their comments during the hearing were effectively a
request to amend the claim. (Appellate Br. at 12.)
Cundick's attorney also explained during the hearing that the assessor's office was working
on changing wording for letters that may issue form the assessor's office, thus indicating that even
if a letter went out in the future (which is not necessarily the case), it would be different from
Cundick's May 29, letter. (See February 16, 2016 Tr. at 11:19- 12:5.)
The District Court denied the Westovers' request for a writ of mandate because there was
nothing to specifically direct Cundick to do, either at the initiation of the lawsuit or at the time of the
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hearing. (Id. at 19:18 - 21:9.) The District Court also ruled that, even assuming there was some
specific act Cundick was required to perform, a writ of mandate was still inappropriate because at
the time the lawsuit commenced there was an appropriate legal remedy available to the Westovers
in the form of a temporary restraining order and injunction. (Id. at 21: 18 - 22:2.) The court denied
the request for a writ of prohibition for the same reason, observing that a claim for injunctive relief
could have been filed at the outset of the case. (Id. at 22:3 - 23:19.) The District Court also
dismissed the slander of title and tortious interference claims, without prejudice, at the request of the
Westovers, who are thus free to pursue those claims again. (Id. at 18: 16 - 19: 17.) While the District
Court expressed doubt about the May 29 letter, it did not rule that he violated any law, nor did it need
to given the narrow basis for its ruling. (See id. at 22:11-16, 23:8-11.)
Final judgment was entered on February 17, 2016, consistent with the District Court's rulings
from the bench. (R. at 214.) The Westovers filed a notice of appeal on March 11, followed by an
amended notice of appeal on April 5. (R. at 210-12; R. at 218-20.)

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the Westovers' claims for writs of

mandate and prohibition on the basis that the Westovers had other claims of relief available to them.
2.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion by not sua sponte amending the

Westovers' claim for a writ of prohibition into a claim for an injunction where, at the time of the
dismissal, there was nothing to enjoin.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 11.

3.

Whether the Westovers have standing to maintain this appeal where they did not

suffer an injury-in-fact at the time the lawsuit commenced and where the case became moot because
the perceived wrong was righted and there is only speculation that it might occur again in the future.

III.
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL

Cundick is entitled to an award of his costs and fees on appeal under Idaho Code §§ 12-107,
12-117, and 12-121. Cundick was sued in both his individual and official capacities. A suit against
Cundick in his official capacity is equivalent to suit against Franklin County itself, which is a
"political subdivision." See, e.g., Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425 (1991) (discussing distinction
between individual and official capacities); Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 903-04 (1993) ("'a suit
against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather a suit
against the official's office. . . . As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.")
(quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 60 (1989)). As shown below, Cundick
should prevail in this matter and, as the prevailing party, is entitled to his costs under I. C. § 12-107.
Additionally, he should be awarded his attorneys fees under I.C. §§ 12-117 and 12-121 because the
appeal does not have a reasonable basis in law or fact and is brought frivolously. Indeed, the
underlying dispute here revolved around ownership ofthe Property. This issue was resolved on June
8, 2015 when the assessors office changed its records to reflect that the Westovers owned the
Property. The issue was thus moot even before the lawsuit commenced. Yet, the Westovers still filed
suit. Then, on December 11, 2015, Cundick issued a letter further clarifying that the Westovers
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owned the Property as of the easement (March 2015). Thus, to the extent any dispute existed
previously, it was certainly resolved by December 2015. Yet the Westovers pursued theirlawsuit,
lost, and still pursue it on appeal even though they have indisputably conceded that the perceived
wrong has already been righted.

IV.
ARGUMENT
The District Court's decision should be affirmed. It appropriately denied the Westovers' claim
for writs ofmandate and prohibition, and dismissed the case, because there were alternative remedies
available to the Westovers that they could have brought when litigation commenced, instead of
seeking special writs. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in not sua sponte amending the
Westovers' claim into a claim for an injunction because doing so would have been futile, as there
was nothing to enjoin. The Westovers' perceived wrong had already been righted, which the
Westovers conceded to the District Court. Additionally, the Westovers lack standing to maintain
this appeal because there is no injury-in-fact to redress. At the time the lawsuit commenced there was
no actual or imminent concrete and particularized injury. There were only unfulfilled threats that
power equipment would be removed from the Westovers' Property if ownership was not clarified,
in light of Cundick's May 29 letter. The issue of ownership, however, was resolved on June 8, when
the assessor's office changed its records to show that the Westovers owned the Property, which was
only about one week after the May 29 letter and well before the complaint was filed.
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Further, even if there was standing early on, the Westovers' case was moot by December 11,
2015, when Cundick, having finally been provided a copy ofthe W estovers' real estate sales contract,
sent a letter to Rocky Mountain Power and the Westovers further clarifying that the Westovers
owned the Property at the time of the easement. Again, the perceived wrong had been righted and
there was nothing therefore to redress. More so, the Westovers cannot maintain a suit on behalf of
other Franklin County residents, especially where there is no evidence that a letter similar to the May
29 letter has been or will be imminently sent out to anyone.
In sum, the underlying dispute in this case was resolved and this appeal serves no meaningful
purpose. For all of these reasons, the District Court's decision should be affirmed and Cundick
awarded his costs and reasonable attorneys fees on appeal.

A.

The District Court Correctly Denied the Westovers' Claim for A Writ of
Mandate and Writ of Prohibition

The W estovers' second claim for relief sought a writ of mandate and a writ of prohibition.

(R. at 36-37 .) Specifically, they sought an order mandating the Franklin County assessor to retract
his May 29, 2015 letter as well as an order genreally prohibiting the assessor "from exceeding his
authority in making property ownership determinations for purposes beyond those required for taxes
and prohibiting him from interfering with real estate transactions in Franklin County[.]" (R. at 38.)
The District Court correctly denied the request for both writs.
A writ of mandate is a special writ used in rare circumstances, to be used sparingly, "to
compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an
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office.... " I.C. § 7-302; Colev. U.S. Dist. Court/or Dist. ofIdaho, 366 F.3d 813,818 (9th Cir. 2004).
The writ is used where one is "seeking to require a public officer to carry out a clearly mandated,
non-discretionary ministerial act." Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Denney, 2015 WL 7421342 (Idaho S.Ct.
Nov. 20,2015)(notyetpublished)(citingCowlesv. Pub~Co. v.MagistrateCt., 118 Idaho 753, 760
(1990)). Further, a writ of mandate is not a tool "to control matters of discretion." Total Success

Invest., LLC v. Ada Cnty Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688,691 (2010). Rather, it is only appropriate
"if the officer against whom the writ is brought has a clear legal duty to perform and if the desired
act sought to be compelled is ministerial or executive nature, and does not require the exercise of
discretion." Id. Significantly, a writ must not be issued where there is "a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course oflaw." I.C. § 7-303; Total Success Investments, LLC, 148 Idaho at.
692.
The counterpart to a writ of mandate is a writ of prohibition, which may be utilized to
"arrest[] the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person." I.C. § 7-40 l;

State v. Dist. Ct. of Fourth Jud. Dist., 143 Idaho 695, 698 (2007). In order to obtain a writ of
prohibition the petitioner must show that the person against whom the writ is being sought is
presently acting without authority or in excessive of authority. Just like a writ of mandate, a writ of
prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that should only be ordered in extraordinary circumstances.
And, as with a writ ofmandate, a writ of prohibition cannot be issued where there is another remedy
available. I.C. § 7-402; State v. Idaho St. Bd. ofLand Com'rs, 150 Idaho 547, 553 (2010).
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Cundick sought dismissal of the claim for writs of mandate and prohibition on multiple
grounds, including that he had not violated any clear legal right, he had no clear legal duty to retract
his letter, and there were alternative remedies available to the Westovers, including claims for
slander of title and tortious interference with a contract or prospective business advantage, both of
which the Westovers had already brought, as well as for declaratory relief or an injunction. The
District Court ruled on the narrow grounds that special writs were inappropriate because the
Westovers could have sought an injunction at the outset of the case.2 This was a legally correct basis
to deny the Westovers' second cause of action under the plain language of LC.§§ 7-302 and 402.
And, because the Westovers had voluntarily asked to have their other two claims dismissed without
prejudice (slander of title and tortious interference), there were no remaining claims. More so, the
Westovers did not ask to amend their complaint a second time, either in court or by filing a motion.
Accordingly, the District Court dismissed their lawsuit.
Importantly, the Westovers do not challenge the basis for the District Court's denial of their
claim for special writs. Instead, they only challenge its purported failure to not sua sponte amend that
claim into a claim for an injunction. The other potential bases on which the District Court could have
denied the claim for special writs are also not at issue on appeal. Thus, whether Cundick's May 29
letter was lawful is not an issue on appeal. Indeed, the District Court did not rule that the letter

In Idaho the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity have been abolished.
Idaho Const., Art. V, § 1. Thus, an injunction, which was historically a suit in equity, may serve
as an appropriate legal remedy.
2
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violated the law, despite the Westovers' suggestion to the contrary. (See Appellate's Br. at 12
(indicating that the District Court recognized that the "Assessor was acting ultra vires ...."). Instead,
the District Court merely expressed that he "probably disagree[d]" with Cundick's position on that
matter. (See February 11, 2016 Tr. at9:7-23, 22:11-16.) It did not need to resolve the issue, however,
given its narrow ruling that there were adequate remedies at law available at the time the lawsuit
commenced. (Id. at 22:11-16, 19:18- 19.)

B.

The Westovers Were Not Entitled to Have Their Complaint Amended
to Seek An Injunction

The Westovers did not ask the District Court to amend their complaint a second time to seek
an injunction. See I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2). Nevertheless, they assert that they did "in effect" ask for
amendment and contend the District Court erred by not amending their claim. (Appellant's Br. at 12.)
Ordinarily, leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires. l.R.C.P. l 5(a)(2).
However, there are several reasons to deny a motion to amend, including undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
and futility of amendment. DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749, 755 (2014). A
trial court's decision denying a motion to amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975,984 (9th Cir. 2011). As such, a trial court's
decision will be upheld so long as: ( 1) the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
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applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason.
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565,573 (1995).
In this case, even if the Westovers' statements during the February 11, 2015 hearing are
liberally construed as a motion to amend the complaint, their request was properly denied because
it was futile.
1.

Rule 54(c) Does Not Direct a Court to Amend a Claim for Writs of
Mandate and Prohibition into a Claim for an Injunction.

As a preliminary matter, the Westovers' argument that the District Court was required by law
to amend their claim under Rule 54(c) must be addressed. The District Court dismissed the
Westovers petition for a special writ of mandate or prohibition because there were available legal
remedies at the time the lawsuit was initiated under which the Westovers' could have sought relief.
(February 11, 2016 Tr. at 19:18 - 23:19) The Westovers assert on appeal that the District Court
should have amended their claim for special writs into a claim for an injunction under Rule 54(c)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, McKay Cons tr. Co. v. Ada CntyBd. ofCnty Com 'rs., 99 Idaho
235 (1978) and Wasdan v. State Bd. ofLand Com'rs, 153 Idaho 190. 3 (See Appellant's Br. at 9-13.)
This argument is incorrect.
The version of Rule 54(c) in effect at the time of the District Court's ruling stated:

The Westovers cite only to the appeal in the second Wasden v. State Board ofLand
Commissioners litigation, i.e., Wasden v. State Bd. ofLand Com'rs, 153 Idaho 190 (2012)
(Wasden II). However, their argument also necessarily implicates the appeal in the first matter,
Wasden v. State Bd. ofLand Com'rs, 150 Idaho 547 (2010) (Wasden I). (See Appellant's Br. at 910.)
3
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A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that
prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, evezy final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings.
I.R.C.P. 54(c) (emphasis added) (pre-July 1, 2016 version).
The judgment in this case was not rendered in favor of the Westovers. They did not prevail.
All claims were dismissed, including the Westovers' claim for writs of mandate and prohibition,
which was dismissed with prejudice. (See R. at 214.) Accordingly, under the plain language of Rule
54(c ), the Westovers were not entitled to any relief.

Wasden I and Wasden II, on which the Westovers rely, do not change this outcome. In that
matter, the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Idaho Supreme Court
seeking to stop the execution of new leases on recreational home sites at Priest Lake and Payette
Lake because the leases violated the Idaho Constitution and Idaho statute. Wasden I, 150 Idaho at
547-548. The petition was dismissed because there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course oflaw available to the Attorney General in the form of injunctive relief. Id. at 552553. On the same day the petition was dismissed, the Attorney General filed a new action to enjoin
the State Board of Land Commissioners from implementing a new lease rate and challenging the
constitutionality of the statute governing the leases. Wasden II, 153 Idaho 190 at 192-193, n. 1. The
district court granted a preliminary injunction and the Attorney General sought summary judgment
on the merits of the challenge to the statute, which was denied. Id. at 193. The issues on appeal
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involved Attorney General's standing as an elected, constitutional officer, id. at 194-96, the
constitutionality of the statute at issue, id. at 196-98, and the dismissal of the individual lessees'
action, id. at 198-200.
Simply put, none of the discussion in either Wasden I or Wasden II stands for the proposition
that a district court is required under Rule 54(c) to convert a petition for a writ of mandate into a
claim for injunctive relief. Indeed, it does not appear that either case even cites Rule 54(c). The only
relevance of either case to the present matter is setting out general legal standards for a special writ

(Wasden I) or for a preliminary injunction (Wasden 11). Otherwise, these cases are not useful here.
Additionally, the Westovers rely on McKay, supra, as standing for the proposition that a
district court must amend a claim for writ of prohibition into a claim for an injunction. (Appellant's
Br. at 10-11.) They even state that the Supreme Court in McKay determined that McKay
Construction, which had brought a petition for writ of prohibition and mandate, "would have been
entitled to injunctive relief which should have been granted pursuant to the mandate of Rule 54(c ),
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." (Appellate Br. at 11.) This statement is incorrect. The Supreme
Court made no such determination. Indeed, the Westover's discussion does not accurately reflect the
proceedings and outcome of McKay, which is much different from the present matter.
In that case, McKay Construction filed a petition for writs of prohibition and mandate
seeking to prohibit Ada County and Whitmore Transportation Services from proceeding under a
contract, to have the contract declared null and void, and to have the contract awarded to McKay
Construction, on the basis that there were deficiencies with the bond obtained by Whitmore
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Transportation and it was not properly licensed. The district court dismissed the petition, finding in
favor of Ada County and Whitmore Transportation on both challenges to the contract. 99 Idaho at
23 7. McKay Construction then filed an amended complaint (referred to as a "Supplemental Petition
and Complaint"), which was dismissed for not alleging a cause of action. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the bond was flawed and that Whitmore
Transportation was not properly licensed. Id. at 23 7-40. Consequently, it reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Id. at 240. In other words, McKay was able to potentially obtain a
special writ against Ada County. The Supreme Court also stated, in connection with its discussion
about Whitmore Transportation's licensing that, even if the licensing problem does not void the
contract, McKay Construction "may nevertheless be entitled to injunctive relief against Whitmore's
continued performance without a public works contractor's license." Id. (emphasis added). It cited
Rule 54(c) in support. Id. This outcome makes sense given that, on remand, if McKay prevailed and
judgment was entered in its favor then it would be entitled to the available relief, including an
injunction against Whitmore Construction.
That is far different from the present circumstances, where the Westovers did not obtain any
relief and their case was dismissed. It appears that the Westovers, in analyzing McKay, have
conflated the issues of the special writs as to Ada County with the injunction as to Whitmore
Transportation, and thus come to an incorrect conclusion. As with Wasden I and II, however, McKay
does not support the Westovers' position that a trial court must amend a claim for writ of prohibition
into a claim for injunctive relief under Rule 54(c). Instead, all that happened in McKay is that the
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Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the case as to both Ada County and
Whitmore Transportation, remanded for further proceedings, and noted that, under Rule 54(c ),
McKay Construction (i.e., for whom judgment would presumably be entered on remand) may be
entitled to an injunction against Whitmore Transportation.
Overall, Rule 54(c), by its plain language, does not apply here and the cases on which the
Westovers rely do not provide them any assistance.

2.

Amendment Was Futile Because The Westovers Were Not Entitled to an
Injunction.

Not only was the District Court not required to amend the Westovers' claim for special writs
into a claim for an injunction under Rule 54(c), there was also not a proper basis at the time the
District Court denied the petition to enjoin Cundick. See I.R.C.P. 65 (governing injunctions and
restraining orders). The Westovers indisputably acknowledged during the February 11, 2016 hearing
that the wrong that they perceived had already been righted in this case. (February 11, 2016 Tr. at
6: 15-18.) Specifically, even though the question of ownership was settled prior to litigation on June
8, 2015, when the assessor's office changed its ownership records to reflect that the Westovers
owned the Property, Cundick voluntarily sent a letter (after finally being shown a copy of their real
estate sales contract) to the Westovers and Rocky Mountain Power on December 11, 2015, using the
exact language proposed by the Westovers, stating in full:
On May 29, 2015 this office advised you that the property description included in the
document referenced above [i.e., the April 20, 2015 easement] was not owned by the
Grantor. Upon further investigation we have determined that on the date the easement
was granted, Val D. Westover was the owner of the property in question.
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(R. at 176, ,r 5; R. at 173.) (bracked language added) In fact, this was exactly what Val Westover
previously represented to the District Court during the November 12, 2015 hearing would resolve
the dispute. (November 12, 2015 Tr. at 14:22-25.)
Thus, as of December 11, 2015, there was simply nothing to enjoin. There was nothing to
mandate because the clarifying letter had already been drafted and sent; and there was nothing to
restrain because the assessor's office was not taking any action affecting the Westovers. See Black's
Law Dictionary, Enjoin (10th ed. 2014) (defining "enjoin" as either a prohibition or restraint, as a
prescription or mandate).
The Westovers cite to several cases standing for the general proposition that cessation of an
illegal conduct does not render a case moot, and thus an injunction would still be appropriate,
because "[t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways." (Appellant's Br. at 13-14.) This principle
does not apply here because it would be impossible for Cundick to resume the allegedly unlawful
prior conduct as to the Westovers. The issue of ownership of the Property is indisputably resolved.
Cundick issued the December 11, 2016 letter to the Westovers and Rocky Mountain Power, which
righted the Westovers' perceived wrong. Consequently, these cases do not control here.
Nevertheless, the Westovers are apparently concerned about the possibility ofletters similar
to the May 29 letter being sent out in the future to other Franklin County residents. The Westovers,
however, do not have standing to assert speculative claims on behalf of others, as discussed below.
More so, there is no evidence in the record of any similar letter presently being sent out by the
assessor's office to any Franklin County citizen. Thus, even if the Westovers could, for the sake of
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argument only, assert some kind of third-party standing, there would still be nothing to enjoin. The
Westovers concerns are mere conjecture. While the present county official has in the past sent letters
to individuals or entities when there was a question as to property ownership, a subsequent county
assessor may not necessarily do the same and, for that matter, the present assessor may simply
choose to take a different approach about sending out future letters. Indeed, during the February 11,
2016 hearing, Cundick's attorney represented that the assessor's office was working on changing
wording in such letters to avoid the issues that led to the current case. (See February 11, 2016 Tr. at
11:19-12:5.) Thus, even if a letter goes out in the future, there is no indication that it would be
similar to the May 29 letter at issue here or present the same concerns raised by the Westovers.
In sum, because there was nothing to enjoin when the District Court dismissed the Westovers'
claim for special writs, it would have been futile to amend their claim into a claim for an injunction.
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in not sua sponte amending the
complaint.

C.

The Westovers Lack Standing.

Standing is a jurisdictional issue, which is a question of law over which the Idaho Supreme
Court exercises free review. State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 880 (2015). In order to
establish standing a plaintiff must show: (I) an injury-in-fact; (2) a sufficient causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 881. "An injury sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an
injury in fact 'must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
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hypothetical."' Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). This means that there must be a "showing of a distinct palpable injury ... that is
easily perceptible, manifest, or readily visible." Id. If the injury has not yet happened, then it must
be imminent. Id. Further, standing requires the party seeking relief to have a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. In other words, the plaintiff must personally have an actual or imminent
injurythatiscapableofbeingredressed.See, e.g., Spokeo,Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1555-1556
(U.S. Reporter citation not yet available) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)
("Plaintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome.... Abstract injury is not enough.")).
The focus of standing is "on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes
to have adjudicated." Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho at 881. More so, a plaintiff must have standing
for each claim. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). And, "[a]s with all
questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness, standing is determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. .... " Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) abrogated on

other grounds by Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010) (internal quotations omitted)
(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 570 n. 4)).4
Related to the issue of standing is mootness, which "'has been described as "the doctrine of
standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement
of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)."' Arizonans for

Idaho courts look to the United States Supreme Court for guidance on standing issues.
Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho at 881.
4
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Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n. 22 (1997) (quoting States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)). "An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and
substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief."

Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 710, 201 P.3d 1282, 1287 (2009) (citing Ameritel Inns, Inc. v.
Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851 (2005)).
At the time ofthe Westovers original complaint on July 30, 2015, no actual distinct, palpable
harm had happened to them and there was no imminent harm. Instead, Rocky Mountain Power had
simply made threats. There was no indication at the time of the lawsuit, however, that any threat
would actually be fulfilled. Rocky Mountain Power did not remove any of its equipment or shut off
the power. In fact, about two months after the lawsuit commenced, the Westovers provided an
affidavit from a Rocky Mountain representative discussing what had previously transpired between
the Westovers and Rocky Mountain Power, stating that, while originally it had threatened to cut off
power within thirty days, it agreed to not take any action because Val Westover represented "that he
would take care ofit. ... " (R. at 117-18.) Rocky Mountain Power made clear that they did not intend
to take any action while the action was pending, and simply reserved the right to take action if it did
not ultimately receive assurance were not received about ownership of the Property. (Id.)
Such concerns became moot on June 8, 2015, when the assessor's office recorded a quitclaim
deed conveying the Property from the Don A. Westover Family Trust to the Westovers, and changed
the ownership of the Property to the Westovers. (R. at 171-72.) The deed indicated a copy would be
sent to the Westovers' counsel's office. (Id.) Therefore, as of June 8, 2015, there was no question as

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 26.

to ownership of the Property and thus no serious basis to believe that Rocky Mountain Power would
shut off power and remove its equipment, given its own sworn representation.
Even if, for the sake of argument, the Westovers had standing at the time of their original
complaint, their case became moot during the lawsuit. The Westovers indisputably acknowledged
during the February 11, 2016 hearing that the wrong that they perceived had already been righted in
this case, as discussed above. (February 16, 2016 Tr. at 6:15-18.) To reiterate, on December 11,
2015, Cundick sent the Westovers and Rocky Mountain Power a letter, using the exact language
proposed by the Westovers, further clarifying that the Westovers owned the Property as of the date
of the easement (March 17, 2015). (R. at 176.) This was what Val Westover had previously
represented to the District Court would be resolve the dispute. (November 12, 2015 Tr. at 14:22-25.
Thus, as of December 11, 2015, the issue was moot. There was nothing left for the District Court to
mandate or prohibit.
Additionally, the Westovers lack standing to assert a claim on behalf of Franklin County
residents. Standing requires a personal interest and the Westovers' personal stake ceased to exist on
December 11, 2015, when their perceived wrong was righted. See Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. 1555-1556.
Further, as discussed above, there is no evidence in the record of any letter similar to the May 29
letter being sent out by the assessor's office to any Franklin County resident and, more so, even if
a letter of some kind were to go out there is no indication that it would present the same concerns
as raised by the Westovers in this lawsuit.
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For these reasons, the Westovers lack standing to maintain this appeal and it should be
dismissed accordingly.

D.

The Westovers Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Last, the Westovers argue that they should be paid their attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117.
(Appellant's Br. at 14-19.) In order to obtain fees under this provision the Westovers must prevail
in this appeal and also demonstrate that Cundick "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
I.C. § 12-117. The Westovers have not made this showing.
Much ofthe Westovers' argument revolves around their contention that the May 29 letter was
unlawful and that their title was slandered. (See Appellant's Br. at 14-17.) Those are not, however,
issues on appeal. To reiterate, the Westovers have not challenged the District Court's basis for
denying their claim for special writs because there were other available legal remedies. Instead, they
only challenge the District Court's purported failure in not sua sponte amending that claim into a
claim for an injunction and entering appropriate relief. This analysis does not turn on the legality of
the May 29 letter. More so, the Westovers sought voluntary dismissal of their slander of title claim,
which was granted without prejudice. The appeal therefore does not turn on whether their title was
slandered. In fact, they are still free to bring that claim.
Further, the Westovers contend that, with the issuance of the December 11 letter, they
obtained the remedy or relief they sought and, therefore, unless the Court awards them their fees
under I.C. § 12-117 the effectiveness of the statute will be "greatly diminished." (Appellant's Br. at
16, 18-19.) This is incorrect. A remedy is anything a court can do for a litigant who has been
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wronged or is about to be wronged." Black's Law Dictionary, Remedy (10th ed. 2014). The
December 11 letter issued by Cundick was done voluntarily based upon the Westovers finally
showing him a copy of their real estate sales contract, not by court order. It does not constitute a
remedy.
Overall, the basic dispute in this case about ownership of the Property was resolved on June
8, 2015, when (prior to the commencement of the lawsuit) the assessor's office changed its
ownership records to reflect that the Westovers owned the Property, thus negating Cundick's May
29 letter stating that the Westovers did not own the property. Nevertheless, the Westovers sued
Cundick. During litigation, Cundick voluntarily issued the December 11 letter further clarifying that
the Westovers owned the Property as of the easement (March 2015). Thus, even if a legitimate
dispute existed previously, it was certainly moot by December 11, 2015. The Westovers then sought
to have their slander of title claim and tortious interference claim dismissed, which was granted, and
the District Court denied their claim for special writs because of the availability of other legal
remedies they could have pursued instead of the special writs. They have not appealed that ruling.
Instead, they appealed from the District Court's purported failure to sua sponte amend their
complaint into a claim for an injunction. They never asked the District Court, however, to amend
their claims a second time. Yet the Westovers now contend that they are entitled to their attorney
fees because Cundick has acted "unreasonably" in this litigation.
This is a case that, as indicated by the District Court, is "ludicrous" and a waste of time and
money. (See November 12, 2015 Tr. at 5:11-12, 6:2-3, 7:6-7, 19:18:24) (stating at various places:
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"I can't figure out why we're here, to be frank .... " "Then why are we here?" "Why are we wasting
- paying attorneys? ... " "What I want to understand is why are we spending attorney fees now to
litigate a moot issue?" "I don't think it's in anyone's best interest to continue this fight and this
litigation. I think this should have been resolved and could have been resolved if there had been an
effort to do that. It seems ludicrous to me that we're going to continue to incur additional attorney
fees and costs beyond sitting down and figuring out a way to get this matter resolved."). It was not
Cundick who filed this lawsuit, pursued it despite acknowledging that the alleged wrong has been
righted, and appealed the denial of a motion which was not requested. The facts do not support the
Westovers' contention that Cundick acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact to justify an
award of fees on appeal.
The W estovers also refer to the private attorney general doctrine in their discussion of the
applicability of Rule 54(c), though not in their section briefing attorney fees. (See Appellant's Br. at
12-13.) It is unclear whether they intend to assert this doctrine as an additional basis of fees and they
have not briefed it. See, e.g., Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708 (2005) (stating that the appellate court
will not consider an argument raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief). In any event, it
is unclear whether the doctrine is available here. Compare Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 569,
573 (2012) (private attorney general doctrine not available in actions governed by LC.§ 12-117) to

SyringaNetworks, LLCv. IdahoDep'tofAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 67 (2013) (stating that LC.§ 12-117
is not the exclusive means of obtaining attorney fees against the named entities). Even if it does
apply, the claimant must demonstrate: (1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy
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vindicated by the litigation; (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the
resultant burden on the plaintiff; and (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision.
Harris v. State, ex rel., Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 407 (2009). The Westovers have not attempted
to show how any of these components are satisfied here.
Even so, the doctrine is not appropriate in this case. Nobody will benefit from this appeal,
not even the Westovers, who have no real interest in the outcome because the wrong they perceived
has been righted and there is only mere conjecture and speculation as to other Franklin County
residents. The Westovers do not have standing to represent those residents and there is no evidence
in the record that any letter similar to the May 29 letter has been sent out or will be imminently sent
out. More so, the issues on appeal are narrow, as they are limited only to whether the District Court
erred in not amending the W estovers claim for special writs into a claim for an injunction. Wider
issues of public policy are simply not at stake here.
For all of these reasons, the Westovers' request for attorney fees should be denied.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision. The
Westovers have failed to set forth any meritorious argument as to why the District Court's decision
was in error or should be reversed. Additionally, the Court should award Cundick his attorney fees
and costs on appeal.
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DATED this 1st day of September, 2016.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

er D. Williams, Of the Firm
ttomeys for Defendants-Respondents
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7579 North Westside Highway
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